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LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
handed down five lands and natural resources opinions which merit re-
view. The first case revisits a controversial Indian reservation boundary
dispute.' A pair of cases address navigational waters issues: the first
concerns the impact of a navigational servitude on Indian lands, 2 the
second deals with a quiet title argument. 3 The fourth case resolves a
mineral patent question. 4 The final case surveyed deals with an environ-
mental impact statement related to a major water diversion project. 5
These five lands and natural resources decisions reflect an inconsis-
tent approach taken by the Tenth Circuit: two of the cases adhere to the
Tenth Circuit's traditional approach in protecting the regulatory power
which governmental agencies wield over lands and natural resources,
while three of the cases demonstrate a departure from the traditional
deference to governmental authority.
I. BOUNDARY DISPUTES
A. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah
1. Background
The primary issue before the United States District Court for the
District of Utah was whether the historic Uncompahgre and Uintah In-
dian Reservations were disestablished 6 by congressional enactments
7
which opened the unallotted and unsettled lands of those reservations
for entry and settlement. 8 The case focused on determining what por-
tions of those reservations were to be considered "Indian Country"
within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. section 1151.9
1. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
3291 (1986).
2. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1986).
3. Utah v. United States, 780 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1985).
4. Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 788 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1986).
5. Lidstone v. Block, 773 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1985).
6. Disestablishment indicates termination of the reservation and total relinquish-
ment of Indian interests in the land. Diminishment refers to a change in boundaries and
subsequent reduction in the size of the reservation. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1085-
92 (D. Utah 1981).
7. See infra note 10.
8. The district court first discussed the threshold issue of criminal jurisdiction over
members of the Ute Indian Tribe. See Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1078
(D. Utah 1981). Significant jurisdictional relationships between the State, local govern-
ments and the Tribe are dependent upon whether lands retain reservation status. Exclu-
sive federal and tribal jurisdiction over the criminal conduct of tribal members extends
only to "Indian Country." See infra note 9. If the lands are outside of "Indian Country,"
the State and its local government agencies have criminal jurisdiction over tribal members.
See, e.g., DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 (1975).
9. The term "Indian Country" includes "all land within the limits of any Indian res-
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The district court determined that the Uncompahgre Reservation
had been disestablished, but the Uintah Reservation had only been di-
minished to the extent of certain gilsonite, forest, and reclamation with-
drawals made by the federal government.' 0 The Ute Indian Tribe
appealed this adverse judgment to the Tenth Circuit. I The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed and reversed in part the lower court's decision.' 2 Upon
motion for rehearing, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district
court, holding that the Uncompahgre Reservation had not been dises-
tablished and the Uintah Reservation was not diminished by the with-
drawal of forest lands. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision in all other respects.
13
2. The Decision of the Tenth Circuit
In Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah,14 the first of several boundary issues
presented to the court concerned a boundary-line dispute involving the
Uintah Reservation.' 5 The second issue before the court dealt with the
Uintah Forest Reserve and its relationship to the Uintah Reservation.16
ervation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issu-
ance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation." 18
U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982).
10. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1153-54. The district court concluded that (1)
Congress disestablished the original Uncompahgre pursuant to the Act of June 7, 1897,
ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 87 (1899); (2) the original Uintah Reservation had been diminished by
Congress through the withdrawal of a 7,040-acre tract known as the Gilsonite Strip, Act of
May 24, 1888, ch. 310, 25 Stat. 157 (1889), through the withdrawal of approximately one
million acres for inclusion in a national forest reserve pursuant to the Act of March 3,
1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048, 1070 (1906), and through the extinguishment of approxi-
mately 56,000 acres for the Strawberry Reclamation and Irrigation Project under the Act
of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Star. 269, 285 (1911); (3) except as expressly diminished, the
Uintah Reservation lands retained continuing status as reservation land, and as "Indian
Country" as that term is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a) (1982); and (4) the reservation
boundaries of the former Uintah reservation were subsequently extended by Congress to
include the lands known as the Hill Creek Extension by the Act of March 11, 1948, ch. 108,
62 Stat. 72 (1949). Id.
11. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983).
12. ChiefJudge Seth, writing for the court, affirmed the trial court's holding as to the
disestablishment of the original Uncompahgre reservation, the diminishment of the Uin-
tah Valley reservation, and the incorporation of the 510,000-acre Hill Creek Extension
within the Uintah and Ouray reservation. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1315. However, the
court reversed the district court's decision "that the unallotted lands at the opening [of the
reservation] remained part of the reservation." Id. Instead, the court held that the Indian
Appropriations Acts of 1902, 1903, 1904 and 1905, opening the Uintah reservation re-
tracted reservation status and, therefore, the unallotted lands became part of the public
domain. Id. at 1308-13; see Act of May 27, 1902, ch. 888, 32 Stat. 245, 263-64 (1903); Act
of March 3, 1903, ch. 994, 32 Stat. 982 (1903); Act of April 21, 1904, ch. 1402, 33 Stat.
189, 207 (1904); Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Star. 1048 (1905). Judge Doyle dis-
sented. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1315-22 (Doyle, J., dissenting). For an insightful
overview of the Tenth Circuit's earlier opinion in this case see note, Eleventh Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey: Lands and Natural Resources, 62 DEN. U.L. REv. 273, 273-78 (1984).
13. Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 773 F.2d 1087 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct.
3291 (1986). Judge Doyle wrote the opinion of the court. The majority of the court
joined Judge Seymour in a concurring opinion. Judge Seth, joined by Judge Barrett,
dissented.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1088-89.
16. Id. at 1089-90.
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Finally, the court addressed the status of the Uncompahgre
Reservation. 17
a. The Solem Test for Determining Disestablishment
In light of the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Solem
v. Bartlett,18 the initial decisions of the trial court and Tenth Circuit be-
came suspect and, therefore, warranted review.19 Thus, in this decision,
the Tenth Circuit considered disestablishment and diminishment issues
utilizing the Supreme Court's newly formulated Solem test.
Historically, the Supreme Court mandated careful and specific re-
view of events affecting the status of an Indian reservation to determine
"whether a congressional determination to terminate is 'expressed on
the face of the Act or [is] clear from the surrounding circumstances and
legislative history.' "20 The 1984 Supreme Court decision in Solem con-
firmed that courts have only two alternative tests to determine whether
Congress intended to disestablish or diminish an Indian reservation.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court in Solem cautioned that under either
test "[d]iminishment, moreover, will not be lightly inferred. Our analy-
sis ... requires that Congress clearly evince an 'intent to change bound-
aries' before diminishment will be found."'' l The first test concentrates
on the statutory language used to open the Indian lands. The Court
explained that "[e]xplicit reference to cession or other language evi-
dencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests strongly
suggests that Congress meant to divest from the reservation all unallot-
ted opened lands."'2 2 If such language is paired with an unconditional
commitment to pay a sum certain for the lands, "there is an almost in-
surmountable presumption that Congress" intended to diminish the
reservation. 23 In the absence of such explict statutory language, the al-
ternative test focuses on whether "events surrounding the passage of a
surplus land act.., unequivocally reveal a widely-held, contemporane-
ous understanding that the affected reservation would shrink as a result
of the proposed legislation."
'2 4
b. The Uintah Reservation
Utilizing the Solem test as the standard for review in the case at bar,
17. Id. at 1090-93.
18. 465 U.S. 463 (1984).
19. See note, Eleventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey: Lands and Natural Resources, 62 DEN.
U.L. REV. 273, 276-78 (1984).
20. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneipp, 430 U.S. 584, 588 n.4 (1977) (quoting Mattz v.
Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 505 (1973)); see Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351 (1962).
21. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470 (quoting Rosebud Sioux Tribe, 430 U.S. at 615).
22. Id. (citing DeCoteau v. District County Court, 420 U.S. 425, 444-45 (1975)); see
also Seymour, 368 U.S. at 354-57 (1962).
23. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470, 471; see, e.g., DeCoteau, 420 U.S. at 447-48 (Agreement be-
tween tribe and United States not only opened all unallotted lands for settlement, but also
appropriated and vested in the tribe a sum certain per acre in exchange for relinquishment
of all unallotted lands.).
24. Solem, 465 U.S. at 471.
1987]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the Tenth Circuit found neither explicit nor implicit evidence in any
congressional enactment of intent to diminish or disestablish the Un-
compahgre and Uintah Reservation. 25 Judge Doyle, writing for the
court, supported the district court's finding that Congress preserved the
Uintah Reservation when it opened a portion of the unallotted lands to
non-Indian homestead and townsite entry in 1905.26 Judge Doyle based
his decision on two factors: first, the Uintah Reservation was clearly es-
tablished as a permanent home for the Ute Tribe by the Act of May 5,
1864,27 and second, in 1905, the Indian Appropriations Act2 8 did noth-
ing more than open the Uintah Reservation for non-Indian settlement.
Utilizing the standards set forth in Solem, Judge Doyle found it signifi-
cant that the 1905 Act failed to include any language of cession or words
"evidencing the present and total surrender of all tribal interests." 2 9 It
was noted that the Ute Indians showed a complete unwillingness to re-
linquish their reservation3 0 and "the language used in that Act, is suffi-
ciently clear to support a finding that the Act [did not disestablish or
diminish] the Uintah Reservation."'3
In summary, the court believed that Congress did not disestablish
the entire Uintah Valley Reservation. The Utes were unwilling to permit
the Reservation to be allotted, but did acquiesce to a limited entry
designed by Congress to encourage gradual non-Indian settlement for
"the purpose[s], in part, of promoting interaction between the races and
of encouraging Indians to adopt white ways." '3 2 Furthermore, the
court's analysis of the legislative history failed to show a "clear" con-
gressional intent to terminate the Uintah Reservation.
3 3
In marked contrast to Judge Doyle's opinion,Judge Seth's dissent
3 4
supported diminishment of the Uintah Reservation. His opinion looked
to Congress' withdrawal of land as indicative of diminishment. 3 5 More-
over, Judge Seth contended that when Congress provided for land allot-
ments to individual Indians, 3 6 the unallotted lands were returned to the
public domain.
3 7
25. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1093.
26. Judge Doyle's opinion was in accordance with his dissent in the earlier panel deci-
sion of this identical case, Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 716 F.2d 1315-22 (10th Cir. 1983)
(Doyle, J., dissenting). Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089; see supra note 12.
27. Act of May 5, 1864, ch. 79, 13 Stat. 64 (1865).
28. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048 (1906).
29. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1088; Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463, 470 (1984).
30. Ule Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089; see also Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp.
1072, 1118 (D. Utah 1981) ("Indian consent to the opening [for settlement] of the Uintah
Reservation was wholly lacking in 1903, and never subsequently appeared.").
31. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1088.
32. See Matt v. Arnett, 412 U.S. at 496 (1973).
33. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089. Reiterating the test in Solem,Judge Doyle stated
"that in the absence of 'substantial and compelling evidence of a congressional intention
to diminish Indian lands,' the courts' 'traditional solicitude for the Indian tribes' must
compel a finding that 'the old reservation boundaries survived the opening.' " Id. (quoting
Solem, 465 U.S. at 472); see also Mattz, 412 U.S. at 505.
34. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1101. (Seth, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 1114-16 (Seth, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1109 (Seth, J., dissenting).
37. Id. (Seth, J., dissenting). Judge Seth's "public domain" argument formed the ba-
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c. Uintah Forest Reserve
The second boundary issue involved the status of the Uintah Forest
Reserve which was set aside under the authority of the Act of March 3,
1905.38 That Act provided that certain lands within the Uintah Reserva-
tion be set apart and reserved.3 9 The Act provided only for a change in
federal management of the land and nothing in the Act referred to a
relinquishment of boundaries. 40 Furthermore, the court indicated that
there is nothing in the Act to indicate that the Ute Indians ceded their
interests in the forest lands.4 1 ThusJudge Doyle wrote "[t]here is clear
evidence that Congress did not intend to extinguish the forest lands of
the Uintah Reservation."
'4 2
The Supreme Court in Solem confirmed that there must be clear
congressional intent to "change boundaries" before diminishment will
be found. 43 Following Solem, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the set-
ting aside of national forest lands in 1905 failed to indicate such an in-
tent to change boundaries. 4 4 The court also noted that the only
changes which have occurred since 1905 are that non-Indians as well as
Indians now hunt on the national forest lands, a successor federal
agency administers the lands, and in 1931 the Indians were paid for a
portion of the value of the timber reserves.
4 5
sis for his opinion in Ute Indian Tribe v. Utah, 716 F.2d 1298 (10th Cir. 1983). See supra
note 12.
38. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1089-90; see Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat.
1048, 1070 (1906).
39. Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat. 1048 (1906). The Act opened the unallot-
ted tribal lands to non-Indian entry and authorized the President to "set apart and reserve
forest lands." Id. at 1070. The Act also allowed the President to "set apart and reserve
any reservoir site or other lands necessary to conserve and protect the water supply for the
Indians or for general agricultural development," and over fifty thousand acres of reserva-
tion lands "were withdrawn from disposal" for reclamation purposes. Id.; see also Ute In-
dian Tribe v. Utah, 521 F. Supp. 1072, 1121 (D. Utah 1981).
The Congressional reclamation authorization in 1905 to the President was limited to
reserving certain of the unallotted lands for homestead and townsite entry. Ute Indian
Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1133. Significantly, in 1910 Congress passed a second statute which
clearly extinguished all Indian claim, title and interest in the lands set aside for reclama-
tion. Act of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Stat. 269, 285 (1911). It is important to note,
however, that a similar statute was never enacted which would have extinguished the Ute
Indians' title and interest to the forest reserve land. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090.
In 1931, Congress enacted provisions to compensate the Utes for 973,779 acres of the
1,010,000 acres of forest lands set aside in 1905. See Act of February 13, 1931, ch. 124, 46
Stat. 1092 (1931); Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090. At that time, Congress clarified the
Indians' legal and equitable interests in the lands set aside in 1905. Therefore, by one
statute, Congress extinguished all Indian title and control over the reclamation lands, Act
of April 4, 1910, ch. 140, 36 Star. 269, 285 (1911); yet in the other, Congress compensated
the Utes for the value of the land, but did not extinguish all of their title, claim and inter-
est. Act of February 13, 1931, ch. 124, 46 Stat. 1092 (1931).
40. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090; see Act of February 1, 1905, ch. 288, 33 Star. 628
(1905) (the administrative authority over the forest lands had been transferred from the
Secretary of the Interior to the Secretary of Agriculture a month prior to the enactment).
41. Utle Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090; see Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1479, 33 Stat.
1048, 1060-70.
42. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090.
43. Solem, 465 U.S. at 470.
44. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090.
45. Id.
1987]
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Judge Seymour, in his concurring opinion, analyzed the effect of the
1905 Act as it related to the establishment of the Uintah Forest Re-
serve.4 6 Judge Seymour examined the language of the 1905 Act and
then reviewed previous congressional actions relating to changes in res-
ervation land status, 4 7 as well as congressional motives behind the crea-
tion of the forest reserve,4 8 to support his view that Congress elected
not to extinguish the Uintah Reservation boundary when it created the
Uintah Forest Reserve.
49
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Seth concluded that "[n]o express
language of termination of Indian jurisdiction over the Forest Service
lands or an express extinguishment of the reservation boundaries was
required." 50 Judge Seth supported this view by pointing to the fact that
the management of the forest lands was transferred from the Depart-
ment of the Interior to the Department of Agriculture.5 Therefore, the
dissenting view interpreted the 1905 Act as withdrawing forest lands
from the reservation and placing those lands under the administration
of the Department of Agriculture. The opinion indicated that the laws
and regulations of the Department of Agriculture are entirely different
from the laws and regulations governing Indians and Indian reserva-
tions and stressed that decisions regarding forest lands should be
viewed in terms of the standards of the Department of Agriculture and
not of the Department of Interior.
52
d. Uncompahgre Reservation
The final issue before the court "is said to be the least popular of
the group." 5 3 The Uncompahgre Reservation covers approximately
2,000,000 acres 54 of land in eastern Utah and since its establishment in
1882 very few Indians or non-Indians have elected to live on the reser-
46. Id. at 1099-1101 (Seymour, J., concurring). Judge Seymour was joined by Chief
Judge Holloway and Judges McKay and Logan to form a majority bloc.
47. Id. at 1093-98 (Seymour, J., concurring). Judge Seymour, focusing on the surplus
land acts enacted at the turn of the century, concluded that the statutes were ambiguous in
the use of "public domain" language and, therefore, explicit language of disestablishment
was not present. Furthermore, he relied on the apparent confusion on the part of Con-
gress concerning the exact nature of the tribe's rights and interests in the land. Id. at
1097-98.
48. The 1905 Act "merely contemplated the opening of the reservation to non-Indi-
ans" rather than disestablishing the reservation. Id. at 1099. Thus, the Act did not termi-
nate the Indians' interests, but preserved them.
49. Id. at 1099-1100.
50. Id. at 1114 (Seth, J., dissenting). Judge Seth initially argued that the transfer of
lands from reservation status to Forest Reserve status for public use evidenced an intent to
remove the lands from the reservation. Id. (Seth, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 1115 (Seth, J., dissenting).
52. Id. (Seth, J., dissenting). Such laws and regulations may be in conflict with one
another. An example of such a conflict arises when Forest Service regulations regarding
hunting and fishing on Forest Service lands differ from hunting and fishing laws regarding
Indians. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 668-69, modified, 444 U.S. 816 (1979); Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Depart-
ment of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 176 n.15 (1977).
53. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1090.
54. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1108 n.l 12.
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vation. 5 5 The reservation's "highest value, in addition to agriculture, is
its mineral deposits, such as gilsonite. ' '5 6 The district court found that
the Uncompahgre Reservation had been disestablished. 5 7 However, the
finding seems to have been based on the "temporary" 5 8 nature of the
reservation and, more importantly, on the interpretation of the phrase
"public domain," in the 1894 Act. 59 The district court found these
words indicative of disestablishment. 60
Following Solm, Judge Doyle concluded that the term "restore to
public domain" is not the same as congressional intent to disestablish
the reservation. 6 1 Instead, he reasoned that "restoring to the public do-
main" is an expression confirming that Indian lands are open to public
entry and settlement, but that the reservation boundaries are to remain
intact. 62 The court held that there was insubstantial evidence to show
diminishment and thus reversed the lower court's decision. 6 3 Not only
did the Uncompahgre Indians fail to cede the unallotted lands of the
Uncompahgre Reservation, but Congress did not use explicit language
of disestablishment or extinguishment in the operative Acts. 64 Further-
more, according to the court, the surrounding circumstances failed to
show "substantial and compelling" evidence of an intent to terminate
the reservation. 6 5 Therefore, the 1882 Uncompahgre Reservation re-
mained intact.
The concurring opinion 6 6 reinforced Judge Doyle's opinion and
underscored the conclusion that a fair and complete reading of the legis-
lative history and surrounding circumstances shows a lack of any lan-
guage or understanding that Congress intended to disestablish the
Uncompahgre Reservation. Judge Seymour stressed that there was a
great deal of historical confusion and ambiguity regarding the Uncom-
pahgre Reservation and the "nature of the Uncompahgres' rights in the
reservation." '6 7 Following Solem, 68 the concurring opinion supported
Judge Doyle's decision and emphasized that the court was "bound to
resolve this ambiguity in favor of the Tribe."
69
55. Ute Indian Tribe, 716 F.2d at 1305.
56. Ute Indian Tibe, 773 F.2d at 1091.
57. Utelndian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1153.
58. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1101-03.
59. See Act of August 15, 1894, ch. 290, 28 Stat. 286, 337 (1895) [hereinafter the 1894
Act].
60. Ute Indian Tribe, 521 F. Supp. at 1153.
61. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1092.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1093.
64. Id.
65. Id. The court concluded that "evidence as to 'surrounding events' [was] ambigu-
ous." Id. Newspaper articles from the period, referring to the Uncompahgre Reservation
as the "former" or "old" reservation, could not be accorded much significance because
they were written from the white settler's point of view. Similarly, the language of the
1894 and 1897 Acts were also ambiguous and therefore without sufficient evidence of an
intent to diminish. Id.
66. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1093-1101 (Seymour, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 1098 (Seymour, J., concurring); see supra note 49.
68. 465 U.S. 475 (1984); see supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
69. Ule Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1098; see infra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
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Judge Seth offered another viewpoint in his dissent. 70 He con-
cluded that the 1894 Act established an intent to extinguish the Uncom-
pahgre Reservation by directing the Secretary of the Interior to open the
unallotted lands of the reservation. 7 1 The dissent then analyzed the
1897 Act "which made the allotment and opening of the Uncompahgre
Reservation mandatory," 72 and concluded that the 1897 enactment sup-
ported disestablishment. 73 Relying particularly on the 1894 Act which
contained the restoration to "public domain" language, Judge Seth em-




Generally, cases involving Indian lands and related jurisdictional is-
sues have been concerned largely with the complex nature of the Indian
tribe's interest in those lands. Certainly, broad generalizations in this
area are hazardous due to the fact that tribal property interests are tied
to specific agreements and treaties rather than to any generalized theo-
ries of tribal sovereignty. This has the effect of burdening the courts
with an expansive analysis of those historical agreements and treaties.
Necessarily involved in this process is an extensive review of the legisla-
tive and executive history associated with enactments and agreements
which established and modified Indian rights to land.
A review of this case confirms the complexity of that analytical pro-
cess. Judge Doyle reviewed the issues in light of the recent Supreme
Court decision, Solem v. Bartlett,7 5 the benefit of which the district court
did not have in their analysis of the case. Based on the Solem decision,
Judge Doyle affirmed the district court's holding that the 1864 Uintah
Reservation had not been diminished by subsequent enactments. 76 Ba-
sic to this holding is that Solem "provides inferences against diminish-
ment" 7 7 and that in the absence of compelling evidence of
congressional intent to disestablish or diminish reservation lands, the
original boundaries are not changed.
78
In reversing the district court's decision regarding the withdrawal of
70. Id. at 1101, 1105-08 (Seth, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 1106-07 (Seth, J., dissenting). Judge Seth reiterated his position that the
land returned to the public domain. Id. at 1106 (Seth, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "limi-
tations on entry" present in the 1894 Act, supra note 59, did not, as the trial court sug-
gested, demonstrate that Congress intended to limit full public domain status, but simply
meant that the land was restored to the public domain and public land laws would apply
without changing the status of the land. Finally, Judge Seth argued that the intent of the
1894 Act was to allot the land to Indians as individuals and open up the land not allotted
under public land laws. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1106. (Seth, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 1107 (Seth, J., dissenting); see Act of June 7, 1897, ch. 3, 30 Stat. 62, 87
(1899).
73. Ute Indian Tribe, 773 F.2d at 1107 (Seth, J., dissenting).
74. Id. at 1106.
75. 465 U.S. 475 (1984).





the Uintah Forest Reserve, Judge Doyle stated that "[t]here is clear evi-
dence that Congress did not intend to extinguish the forest lands of the
Uintah Reservation. ' 79 Judge Doyle also reversed the lower court's de-
cision regarding the disestablishment of the Uncompahgre Reservation.
He resolved the issue in terms of the Solem decision by stressing, again,
that clear evidence of intent to disestablish the reservation could not be
found.8 0
The concurring opinion placed emphasis on the historical back-
ground of the salient legislation and executive orders. Clearly, Judge
Seymour and the majority of the court captured the essence of the prob-
lem in this case - that ambiguities are to be resolved in favor of the
tribe.
However, the reasoning of the court was not left unchallenged.
Judge Seth, in a dissenting opinion, found disquieting gaps in the rea-
soning and analysis of the case and even indicated that any reference to
the Solem standard was inappropriate.8 ' Judge Seth developed alterna-
tive interpretations of the legislative history involved in the case, which,
in his opinion, would require the disestablishment and diminishment of
reservation land.
II. NAVIGATIONAL WATERS
A. Cherokee Nation v. United States
1. Facts
The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma brought a compensatory action
against the United States regarding property used by the United States
in the McClellan-Kerr Navigation Project. 82 The basis for the claim was
that the construction of dams and waterways altered the channel of the
Arkansas River causing a loss of valuable assets of sand, gravel and coal
in the Arkansas riverbed, and thus constituted an uncompensated taking
under the fifth amendment. 8 3 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma granted summary judgment in favor of the
Cherokee Nation, holding that the United States had granted fee simple
title to the Cherokee Nation, without the reservation of a navigational
servitude.84 Therefore, the district court reasoned that since the Chero-
79. Id. at 1090.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1103 (Seth. J., dissenting).
82. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1986). The Mc-
Clellan-Kerr Navigation Project [hereinafter the Project] was an element of the construc-
tion of the Arkansas River Navigation System. Id.
83. U.S. CONST. amend. V states in pertinent part: "nor shall private property be
taken for public use, without just compensation." The Cherokee Nation "sought just com-
pensation for the past and future loss of the mineral deposits, fair market value of the
damsites, and other damage to the bed and banks of the Arkansas River." Cherokee Nation,
782 F.2d at 873.
84. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 873. The court stated "that the term navigational
servitude describes the superior interest of the United States in navigation and the nation's
navigable waters." Id. at 875-76 (citing United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S.
222, 224-25 (1956)). Additionally, the Tenth Circuit noted that "[t]he term expresses the
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kee Nation had a vested property right in the riverbed, the United States
was monetarily liable for a taking of private tribal interests.
85
On an interlocutory appeal by the United States, the Tenth Circuit
affirmed the lower court's decision, but it did not adopt the district
court's reasoning.8 6 The sole issue before the court was whether the
United States' assertion of a navigational servitude over land held in fee




During the first half of the Nineteenth Century, the Cherokee In-
dian Nation was relocated west of the Mississippi River pursuant to trea-
ties with the United States Government.88 In the Treaty of New
Echota,8 9 the United States agreed to convey lands in fee simple to the
Cherokees. It also agreed that no part of the lands granted to the Indi-
ans would be included in any state or territory. Some eastern Cherokees
were reluctant to leave their homeland, but were moved by military
force to lands west of the Mississippi River in 1838.90 A major portion
of the Arkansas River lay within the exterior bounds of the Cherokee
Nation by virtue of the Treaty of New Echota, which incorporated by
reference two earlier treaties. 9 1
In order to pave the way for the creation of the State of Oklahoma,
however, the United States Government negotiated the extinguishment
of tribal titles.9 2 The Dawes Commission of 189393 recommended an
agreement with the Cherokees which, in essence, nullified the earlier
treaties and provided for the allotment of Indian lands to individual
members of the Cherokee Nation. 94 The bed of the Arkansas River was
notion that the right of the public to use a waterway supersedes any claim of private own-
ership." Id. at 876; see United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
85. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 876.
86. Id.
87. Id. The court reserved a second issue - "whether the exercise of a navigational
servitude constituted the breach of some duty of care to the Cherokee Nation" - pending
appeal. Id.
88. Treaty with the Cherokees, May 6, 1828, 7 Stat. 311 (western Cherokees' ceded
lands in Arkansas for land in Oklahoma); Treaty with the Cherokees, Feb. 27, 1819, 7 Stat.
195 (1820) ("Old Settler" or western Cherokee were relocated to lands provided for them
in Arkansas Territory); Treaty with the Cherokees, July 8, 1817, 7 Stat. 156 (1818) (Chero-
kee Nation traded lands in Georgia for an equal amount of land in Arkansas Territory).
89. Treaty with the Cherokees, December 29, 1835, 7 Stat. 478 (1836) (referred to as
the "Treaty of New Echota").
90. Thousands died in this forced migration, which is known as the "Trail of Tears."
See generally, F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN Lw 92 (1982).
91. Treaty with the Cherokees, May 6, 1828, 7 Stat. 311 (1828); Treaty with the Cher-
okees, Feb. 14, 1833, 7 Stat. 414 (1834).
92. Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, § 16, 27 Stat. 612, 645 (1894).
93. The Dawes Commission was created by the Act of March 3, 1893, ch. 209, 27 Stat.
612, 645 (1894).
94. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 627 (1970); see Act ofJune, 28, 1898,
ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495 (1899) (enacted the recommendations of the Dawes Commission and
forced the Cherokee Nation to execute an agreement with the United States); Act ofJuly 1,
1902, ch. 1375, 32 Stat. 716 (provided for final disposition of affairs of Cherokees and
required that lands be held by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians); Act
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not allotted. Therefore, under the patent issued by the United States to
the Cherokee Nation in 1838, the fee simple title to the Arkansas
riverbed arguably was vested in the Cherokee Nation, and held in trust
by the United States for the Cherokees.9 5 Subsequently, in 1907,
Oklahoma was admitted to the Union "on an equal footing with the
original states."
9 6
3. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
In recounting the early, often troubled, history of the Cherokee Na-
tion, the Tenth Circuit relied heavily upon the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma.9 7 In Choctaw Na-
tion, the State of Oklahoma argued that, in accordance with the equal
footing doctrine, title to the bed of the Arkansas River passed from the
United States to "Oklahoma upon admission to the Union as an incident
of statehood."' 98 However, the Supreme Court held that the United
States intended to and did convey the title to land underlying the navi-
gable portions of the Arkansas River and, more specifically, the owner-
ship of the minerals beneath the riverbed.9 9
In light of the Choctaw Nation decision, the Tenth Circuit held that
while the United States could exercise a navigational servitude in the
Arkansas River, the Cherokee Nation had the right to just compensa-
tion. 10 0 This article reviews the court's reasoning and conclusions.
a. Navigational Servitude
The Tenth Circuit first reviewed the district court's holding that a
failure to reserve a navigational servitude in the land patent resulted in
the loss of the right to assert it.' ° 1 The United States' argument on
appeal was two-pronged: first, that "the navigational servitude is a con-
stitutional power arising from the Commerce Clause and permits no
of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 27, 34 Stat. 137, 148 (1906) (provided that remaining tribal
property "be held in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians").
95. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 627, 634-36.
96. Act ofJune 16, 1906, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 267 (1907). New states are admitted on an
equal footing with the other states and the United States holds beds to navigable waters in
trust for future states. The equal footing doctrine is a court-made rule founded upon
Article IV, section 3, clause 2 of the United States Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations re-
specting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONST. art.
IV, § 3, cl. 2. The Supreme Court first articulated the doctrine in Pollard v. Hagan, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 212, 222-23, 229 (1845):
When Alabama was admitted into the Union, on an equal footing with the
original states, she succeeded to all the rights of sovereignty, jurisdiction, and
eminent domain which Georgia possessed at the date of the cession, except so far as
this right was diminished by the public lands remaining in the possession and under the control
of the United States, for the temporary purposes provided for in the deed of cession,
and the legislative acts connected with it.
Id. at 223 (emphasis added).
97. 397 U.S. 620 (1970).
98. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 627-28.
99. Id. at 621,635.
100. Cherokee Nation v. United States, 782 F.2d 871, 879 (10th Cir. 1986).
101. Id. at 875.
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'special exception' for Indian tribes," and, second, that the Cherokee
Nation is a "quasi-sovereign at the sufferance of Congress and subject to
the dominant power of a navigational servitude."10 2 The Tenth Circuit
agreed that a navigational servitude may in the interest of interstate
commerce create an exception to the United States' obligation to pay
just compensation under the taking clause of the fifth amendment.'
0 3
However, the court cautioned that "the Supreme Court has never held
that 'the navigational servitude create[d] a blanket exception to the Tak-
ing Clause whenever Congress exercises its Commerce Clause authority
to promote navigation.' "104
The Tenth Circuit noted that, despite other reservations, 10 5 the
United States failed to reserve a navigational servitude in the Treaty of
New Echota. Nevertheless, it found indisputable the fact that the Com-
merce Clause' 0 6 grants Congress broad powers over interstate activity,
including navigation.1 0 7 At this point, however, the Tenth Circuit devi-
ated from the district court, and held that the existence of the navigational
servitude in the Arkansas River was never in question, but the effect of
the reservation was at issue. 10 8 The court proceeded to limit the appli-
cation of the navigational servitude. Judge Moore, writing for the ma-
jority, observed that "the assertion of a navigational servitude on
particular waters acknowledges only that the property owner's right to use
these waters is shared with the public at large."' 1 9 Furthermore, the
court held that fifth amendment constitutional limitations apply to navi-
gational servitudes.110
As Choctaw Nation indicates, the 1838 patent of the United States
granting to the Cherokee Nation fee simple title to the Arkansas
riverbed was unique because after the patent the Cherokee Nation was
not a mere riparian owner of land along the Arkansas River, but the fee
simple title owner of the riverbed."'I Consequently, cases dealing with
the rights of riparian owners along a public navigable stream were not
102. Id.
103. Id. at 876.
104. Id. (quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 172 (1979)).
105. Id.
106. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8.
107. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 876; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 22
(1824) ("It is a common principle, that arms of the sea, including navigable rivers belong
to the sovereign, so far as navigation is concerned. Their use is navigation." (emphasis in origi-
nal)); see, e.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 173-74 (1979) (A shallow la-
goon, dredged for development as a marina, fell within the definition of "navigable
waters" and thus was subject to Congress' "extensive authority over this Nation's waters
under the Commerce Clause."); United States v. Grand River Authority, 363 U.S. 229,
231-32 (1960) ("[W]hen the United States asserts its superior authority under the Com-
merce Clause to utilize or regulate the flow of the water of a navigable stream there is no
'taking' of 'property' in the sense of the Fifth Amendment because the United States has a
superior navigation easement which precludes private ownership of the water or its
flow."); United States v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 426 (1940) (au-
thority of Congress over navigable waters is as broad as the needs of commerce).
108. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 876.
109. Id. at 877 (emphasis in original).
110. Id.
11. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 633-35; Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 877.
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applicable." 2 In the opinion of the court, the instant case was one of
special circumstances which favored the Indian tribe.
In conclusion, the court held that when the United States Corps of
Army Engineers entered the Arkansas River without the consent of the
Cherokee Nation, altered its natural course and destroyed the valuable
sand and gravel assets of the Cherokee Nation by dredging its main
channel and building three dams on the riverbed, the United States took
private property from the Cherokees and converted it to its own public
use." t 3 Therefore, the court decided that the United States was re-
quired to pay just compensation to the Cherokee Nation, the fee title




Based on the uniqueness of the riverbed's ownership granted to the
Cherokees, the court also "consider[ed] the principle that rights secured
by treaty will not be deemed to be abrogated or modified absent a clear
expression of Congressional purpose."' 14 The Supreme Court has es-
tablished certain canons of construction that must be applied in matters
involving the interpretation and construction of Indian treaties. These
canons mandate that treaties be liberally construed in favor of Indi-
ans, 15 that ambiguous expressions in treaties must be resolved in favor
of Indians, 1 16 and that treaties should be construed as the Indians
would have understood them.'
17
112. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 877.
113. Id. at 878-79. The Army Corps of Engineers acted pursuant to the Flood Control
Act of 1944, Act of Dec. 22, 1944, ch. 665, 58 Stat. 887, 890 (1945), and the Rivers and
Harbors Act of 1946, Act of July 24, 1946, ch. 595, 60 Stat. 634, 635-36 (1947).
114. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 877.
115. Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943); Choate v. Trapp, 224
U.S. 665, 675 (1912).
116. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973); Carpenter
v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 367 (1930); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908).
117. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 631; United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. I 11,
116 (1938); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 551-54, 582 (1832). In view of the
principles set forth in Choctaw Nation, it was not disputed by the court that "to take a valua-
ble portion of the grant to the Cherokee Nation without compensation would alter the
purpose for which Congress set aside the land originally." Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at
878. See also Moore v. United States, 157 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1946). The Cherokee Nation
paid no small price for the reservation that was set aside for their exclusive use and benefit.
The Cherokee Tribe was at the mercy of the United States' "superior negotiating skills and
superior knowledge of the language in which treat[ies were] recorded." Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76
(1979).
Moreover, the reluctance of the Supreme Court to hold that an act of Congress abro-
gates a treaty has led to a number of other special rules concerning construction of Indian
treaties. For example, in Leavenworth, Lawrence, and Galveston R.R. Co. v. United
States, 92 U.S. 733 (1876), where the issue was whether a statutory grant included treaty
lands, the Supreme Court concluded that "there [must] be an express declaration to that
effect," otherwise, "the presumption is conclusive that Congress never meant to grant it."
Id. at 741-42. In United States v. Santa Fe Pacific R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1941), where the
United States sued to protect Indian occupancy of lands, the Court held that Indian title
1987]
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In Cherokee Nation, the Tenth Circuit recognized the Supreme
Court's reluctance to abrogate Indian treaty rights, 1 8 and concluded
that "if the effect of exercising a navigational servitude is to alter or ex-
tinguish rights secured by treaty and unrelated to the power to use with-
out the express authorization of Congress, just compensation is
required." 19
ii. Fiduciary Relationship
The court also examined the navigational servitude within the con-
text of a fiduciary relationship between the United States and the Chero-
kee Nation. 120 Citing the Act of April 26, 1906, the Supreme Court in
Choctaw Nation, held that all unallotted tribal property would " 'be held
in trust by the United States for the use and benefit of the Indians.' ",121
As a consequence of this trust relationship, the Tenth Circuit found that
a limitation on Congressional power was mandated. 12 2 This trust rela-
tionship required the United States to manage and control the tribe's
affairs and imposed a duty to guard the trust property for the benefit of
the Cherokee Nation. 123 According to the Cherokee Nation, therefore,
when the United States took Cherokee property for its own public uses
in the construction of the McClellan-Kerr Navigation Project, the United
States violated the trust relationship.
had never been extinguished because there was no showing that Congress had expressed a
"clear and plain" intention to extinguish the Tribes' right. Id. at 354.
The same special rules of construction have been followed in cases asserting that a
later general Congressional act abrogated an earlier treaty right. For example, in Choate
v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912), the State of Oklahoma contended that an act of Congress
allowed the state to tax Indian allotments. The Court held that doubtful expressions in
the statute must be "resolved in favor of" the Indians. Id. at 676. Later, in Squire v.
Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956), the issue was whether the later-enacted capital gains provi-
sions of the Internal Revenue Code could be applied to income generated from trust prop-
erty, despite the language of the earlier-enacted General Allotment Act which required
property to be given to Indians free of liens. Although the government argued that the
income tax could be levied even though no lien could be imposed, the Court held that it
could not agree that the "taxability of respondents in these circumstances is unaffected by
the treaty." Id. at 6. A more recent case, Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404
(1968), involved the question of whether a termination statute enacted by Congress nulli-
fied treaty rights of tribal members to hunt and fish on the reservation free from state
regulation. The Court emphasized that the act contained no "explicit statement" abrogat-
ing hunting and fishing rights, and that such an intention would not be "lightly imputed"
to Congress. Id. at 413 (quoting Pigeon River Co. v. Cox Co., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934)).
In fact, the Court recognized that treaty rights are a form of property protected by the fifth
amendment. Id. at 413. Finally, Menominee was expressly reaffirmed in Washington v.
Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) where
the Court stated that "[a]bsent explicit statutory language, we have been extremely reluc-
tant to find congressional abrogation of treaty rights." Id. at 690.
118. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 877.
119. Id. at 878.
120. Id. at 878-79.
121. Choctaw Nation, 397 U.S. at 627 (citing Act of April 26, 1906, ch. 1876, § 27, 34
Stat. 137, 148 (1907)).
122. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 878.
123. Id. The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371
(1980) that "this power to control and manage [is] not absolute. While extending to all
appropriate measures for protecting and advancing the tribe, it [is] subject to limitation
inhering in .. .a guardianship and to pertinent constitutional restrictions." Id. at 415.
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In upholding the Cherokee's contention, the Tenth Circuit relied
on United States v. Creek Nation, 124 where the Supreme Court held that as
a guardian of the property of an Indian tribe the United States can man-
age and control the trust property, but it cannot give it away to others or
use it for its own purposes without becoming liable to the tribe. The
court concluded that "[l]ike any other trust relationship, the United
States, as trustee, is obligated to act for the benefit of the tribe absent
Congressional authorization to the contrary."' 25 This duty to the Cher-




The dissenting opinion 12 7 of Judge Seth is persuasive through its
logical veracity. He argued that "the nature and source of [the Chero-
kee Nation's] title makes no real difference."' 2 8 Noting that all con-
cerned parties agreed that the Arkansas River is navigable, 129 he
explained that navigable waters are "public property" under the exclu-
sive control of the federal government pursuant to the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution. 13 0 Therefore, in Judge Seth's
view, this power to regulate navigation gave the United States a "domi-
nant servitude;" the exercise of which was not an invasion of any private
property rights in the river or any lands underlying it. l 3 l Hence, there
could be no taking from riparian owners for which just compensation
was due.
Judge Seth also responded to the Cherokee Nation's assertion that
they are a sovereign nation and, therefore, the navigational servitude of
124. 295 U.S. 103 (1935). In Creek Nation, like the instant case, the Creek Nation had
fee simple title to the lands. "That title was acquired and held under treaties, in one of
which the United States guaranteed to the tribe quiet possession." Id. at 109. In analyzing
the relationship between the Creek and the United States, the Court held that while the
tribe was under the guardianship of the United States and the United States was responsi-
ble for the management and control of the reservation, that control "did not enable the
United States to give the tribal lands to others, or to appropriate them to its own purposes,
without rendering . . .just compensation for them." Id. at 110.
125. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 879. In neither the Flood Control Act nor the Rivers
and Harbors Act was any provision made for payment to the Cherokee Nation for lands
taken for the construction of the three dams on the Arkansas riverbed. Furthermore, Con-
gress did not indicate that there was an "overriding public need" for the construction of
the dam which might authorize such a taking. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 880-83 (Seth, J., dissenting).
128. Id. at 880 (Seth,J., dissenting). Judge Seth emphasized that the navigational servi-
tude represents a constitutional power, not a property right. Referring to the Supreme
Court's decision in Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981), Judge Seth stated:
" '[T]he United States retains a navigational easement in the navigable waters lying within
the described boundaries for the benefit of the public, regardless of who [Montana or the
Crow Tribe] owns the riverbed.' " Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 882 (Seth, J., dissenting)
(quoting Montana, 450 U.S. at 555).
129. Cherokee Nation, 782 F.2d at 880-81 (Seth, J., dissenting).
130. Id. at 881 (Seth, J., dissenting); see supra notes 101-15 and accompanying text.
131. Id. (Seth, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 122-23
(1967)).
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the United States could not be effective against them.' 3 2 He argued that
Indian tribes had lost many of the attributes of sovereignty, and there
was no reason to limit the application of the navigational servitude doc-
trine to exclude Indian tribes. For Judge Seth, the Cherokees were not
above the application of the doctrine of navigational servitude, espe-
cially since the exercise of the servitude is not the taking of property but
the exercise of a power to which any riparian-property owner, including
the Cherokee Nation, has always been subject.
13 3
5. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit determined that although the United States
could exercise a navigational servitude in the Arkansas River, the Chero-
kee Nation was entitled to just compensation for the taking. Both Chero-
kee Nation and Ute Indian Tribe marked victories for the Indian tribes over
the intrusion of governmental interests. More importantly, however,
the decisions in this area reflect a general sentiment that ambiguities are
to be resolved in favor of the Indian tribes, a trend which will undoubt-
edly continue in the Tenth Circuit.
B. Utah v. United States
1. Facts
Utah Lake is a large, fresh-water lake, covering approximately 150
square miles, located in Utah County, Utah. 134 In 1889, the United
States designated Utah Lake as a reservoir site, under the provisions of
the Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888.135 The controversy prompting
this litigation, however, did not arise until 1976 when the Bureau of
Land Management (the BLM) issued oil and gas leases on the bed of
Utah Lake. 1
3 6
The State of Utah sought an injunction 13 7 in the United States Dis-
132. Id. at 882 (Seth, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 882-83 (Seth, J., dissenting).
134. For a general description of Utah Lake, see Utah v. Marsh, 740 F.2d 799, 800-01
(10th Cir. 1984).
135. Act of October 2, 1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505, 526-27 (1889) [hereinafter the
1888 Act].
136. Utah v. United States, 780 F.2d 1515, 1516 (10th Cir, 1985).
137. The State of Utah insisted that its action was one for declaratory judgment, while
the defendant United States maintained that the action was one under the Quiet Title Act,
28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1978). The district court found that a declaratory judgment action
would lie against the United States, relying on section 702 of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1982) for the proposition that section 702 waived the sovereign im-
munity of the United States for a declaratory judgment action in which subject matter
jurisdiction was based upon federal question jurisdiction. Utah v. United States, 624 F.
Supp. 622, 624-26 (D. Utah 1985). See Carpet & Linoleum & Resilient Tile Co. v. Brown,
656 F.2d 564, 567 (10th Cir. 1981) (section 702 of the Administrative Procedure Act
waived sovereign immunity in mandamus action based on federal question jurisdiction).
The Tenth Circuit recharacterized the action as one for quiet title, relying on the Supreme
Court decision in Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Board of University and School Lands, 461
U.S. 273, 282-90 (1983), and stated that "the Court ruled that Congress intended the
Quiet Title Act to provide the exclusive means by which adverse claimants could challenge
the United States' title to real property." Utah, 780 F.2d at 1517 n.2.
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trict Court for the District of Utah claiming that it obtained title to the
bed of Utah Lake under the equal footing doctrine at the date of state-
hood, or alternatively, that it obtained title to the lakebed under the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953.138 The United States contended, how-
ever, that by withdrawing the lake as a reservoir site, the federal govern-
ment effectively reserved the lakebed of Utah Lake in federal ownership
thereby preventing title from passing to Utah under the equal footing
doctrine at the date of its statehood.13 9 After the district court granted
summary judgment in favor of the United States, 140 Utah appealed to
the Tenth Circuit. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, quieting title to the bed
of Utah Lake in the United States.'
4 1
2. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The principal issues presented on appeal were (1) whether the State
of Utah obtained title to the bed of Utah Lake under the equal footing
doctrine, or (2) whether the State of Utah gained title to the bed of Utah
Lake under the Submerged Lands Acts. 1
42
a. The Equal Footing Doctrine
Under the principles of the equal footing doctrine, the presumption
exists that the United States "holds [lands under navigable waters] in
trust for future States, to be granted to such States when they enter the
Union and assume sovereignty on an 'equal footing' with the established
state."' 4 3 In applying the equal footing doctrine, the critical issue is
whether Congress plainly or "definitely declared" its intent to withdraw
the land before a State entered the Union. 14 4 In analyzing congres-
sional intent, courts will determine if a "public exigency' 14 5 necessi-
tated a departure from the policy of reserving owernship of land under
navigable waters for the future states.
138. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1516; see 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1982).
139. Utah v. United States, 780 F.2d 1515, 1516 (10th Cir. 1985); see supra note 96 and
accompanying text.
140. Utah v. United States, 624 F. Supp. 622 (D. Utah 1985). Based upon its interpre-
tation of the language used in correspondence and documents surrounding the events, the
district court found that the United States withdrew the bed of Utah Lake as part of its
1889 reservoir site selection. Id. at 626-27. The lower court further found that the equal
footing doctrine did not cut off the United States' title in the lakebed where "[t]he with-
drawal of Utah Lake was made 'after acquiring the territory and before the creation of the
state' for the carrying out of 'public purposes appropriate to the objects for which the
territory was held.' " Id. at 628 (quoting United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49, 54-
55 (1926)). Finally, the district court found that the bed of Utah Lake was excepted from
the Submerged Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-15 (1964), by way of a provision which ex-
cluded "all lands expressly retained by ... the United States when the State entered the
Union." Id.; see 43 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (1964).
141. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1525.
142. Id. at 1517.
143. Id. at 1518 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 551-52 (1981)); see
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
144. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1518-19 (quoting Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 552
(1981)); see United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S. 49 (1926).
145. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1519; Montana, 450 U.S. at 552.
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i. The 1889 Reservoir Site Selection
In the instant case, the Tenth Circuit found that the withdrawal of
Utah Lake, including the bed, was clearly made for a public purpose and
motivated by public exigency. The requisite congressional intent was
evidenced by Congress' concern "that arid lands of the western states be
orderly and fairly irrigated, reclaimed, and settled."' 14 6 Furthermore,
the court's review of the United States Geological Survey (U.S.G.S.)




(A.) The Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888
The Sundry Appropriations Act of 1888148 provided that all lands
selected as reservoir sites "are from this time henceforth hereby re-
served from sale as the property of the United States and shall not be
subject ... to entry, settlement or occupation until further provided by
law."' 49 The Act authorized the selection of land for reservoir sites and
reserved such designated sites as the property of the United States.
The State argued that "the Act's proscription on 'entry, settlement
or occupation' of lands selected under the Act' 150 limited lands which
could be selected to those which could be entered, settled or occupied
and, therefore, excluded the beds of navigable waters. However, the
Tenth Circuit found no merit in the argument and concluded that the
Act "imposes no restriction on the U.S.G.S.'s selection authority on the
type of lands that could be designated or selected."
15 '
(B.) Subsequent Congressional Action
The State also relied on its interpretation of the legislative history
of amendments to the 1888 Act to support the view that the United
States did not have the authority to select Utah Lake as a reservoir
site. 152 Utah initially looked to statements made in subsequent house
146. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1524.
147. Id. at 1520. These documents also showed that the United States contemplated
plans to lower the level of the lake as well as to make the water available by means of
ditches and canals from the lake. Id. at 1523. Thus, these documents indicated that Utah
Lake was withdrawn for an important public purpose and these plans could not have been
realized unless the bed of Utah Lake had also been withdrawn. Id. at 1524.
148. Act of October 2, 1888, ch. 1069, 25 Stat. 505, 526-27 (1889) [hereinafter the
1888 Act].
149. Id. at 527.
150. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1521.
151. Id.
152. Id.; see Act of August 30, 1890, ch. 897, 26 Stat. 371, 391 (1891) (repealing the
1888 Act except as it reserved reservoir sites); Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat.
1095, 1101-02 (1892) (restricting the reservation of reservoir sites to "only so much land
as is actually necessary for the construction and maintenance of reservoirs" and providing
for rights of way across public lands for the construction of irrigation canals and ditches to
the extent construction did not interfere with the United States' occupation of the land);




debates to bolster the premise that the purpose of the 1888 Act was to
arrest the monopoly and rampant speculation of western public
lands. 153 The State further asserted that (1) the legislative history dem-
onstrates that reservoir site withdrawals were not permanent, but only
temporary, in order to facilitate the fair development of the public
lands 154 and (2) "by their nature, beds of navigable waters simply could
not have been part of the problem Congress wanted to remedy."'
155
The court discounted both arguments as being in direct conflict with the
provisions of the 1888 Act.' 5 6
Furthermore, the State argued that Congress intended that only the
adjacent uplands surrounding natural navigable lakes be withdrawn as
reservoir sites. Utah's argument was based on the assumption "that
Congress was concerned in every instance with those uplands that might
be inundated if and when the water level was raised."' 5 7 The court was
not persuaded by the State's contention and pointed out that the con-
cern of the U.S.G.S. with respect to Utah Lake was not limited to the
adjacent uplands that might be inundated, but rather necessarily ex-
tended to the natural lakebed itself which would be exposed as the water
level was lowered.1
58
Therefore, in reviewing the legislative history of the amendments to
the 1888 Act, the court found nothing to substantiate the State's asser-
tion that Congress revoked any of the reservoir selections made by the
U.S.G.S. pursuant to the 1888 Act. 159 The court concluded that the
U.S.G.S. intended to withdraw the bed of Utah Lake in its 1889 reservoir
selection. 160 Furthermore, the court cautioned the State for basing its
153. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1522. The historical background of the passage of the 1888 Act
and the legislative history of subsequent amendments make it clear that one of Congress'
primary concerns was the monopolization of reservoir sites by corporations. By 1888 it
had come to the attention of Congress that large corporations were making fraudulent
land filings under the various land entry laws and were seeking to acquire vast tracts of the
public domain in the West. There was also evidence that the large corporations were
seeking to monopolize water resources of the area in order to sell water to farmers at
exhorbitant profits. See generally, 21 CONG. REC. 7297-7399 (1890) (statement of Sen.
Reagan).
154. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1522.
155. Id.
156. Id. Regarding the first argument, the Tenth Circuit found that the plain language
of the 1888 Act, reserving sites to the United States "until further provided by law," re-
futed the State's claim by allowing for the possibility of non-temporary withdrawals. Id.
The court relied on the language of the Act and the U.S.G.S. interpretation of it to dispose
of the second argument. Id. at 1522-23.
157. Id. However, a U.S.G.S. report stated that the segregation of Utah Lake included
"not only the bed but the lowlands up to the mean highwater." U.S.G.S., ELEVENTH ANN.
REP. OF THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, PT. II, 183, 184
(1889-90). Furthermore, the Tenth Circuit pointed out that "although officials of the
U.S.G.S. initially thought that the water level of Utah Lake should be raised, subsequent
studies indicated that the water level should be lowered below the natural shoreline."
Utah, 780 F.2d at 1523. Similarly, the U.S.G.S. stated that the withdrawal of Utah Lake was
a "segregation of the land around and under the lake." U.S.G.S., TWELFTH ANN. REP. OF
THE U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY TO THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR, PT. II - IRRIGATION 339
(1892),
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line of argument on the "views of individual Congressmen who were
part of a different Congress from that which passed the 1888 Act."'
16 1
(C.) Mineral Estate
Utah alternatively claimed that "the 1888 Act authorized withdrawal
of the surface estate only, and not the mineral estate" of the lakebed.
162
Utah's argument reasoned that the reservoir site withdrawal did not seg-
regate the mineral estate from the public domain and since "the mineral
estate had not been reserved or withdrawn, it would have passed to Utah
at statehood."' 16 3 No authority was cited for this proposition. The court
noted that the 1888 Act makes no distinction between the surface and
subsurface estates. 16 4 The court held that "the 1888 Act and the reser-
vation made pursuant to it covered the lakebed, and underlying miner-
als, not just the surface of the bed, among the lands withdrawn in
connection with Utah Lake."'
6 5
iii. The Selection Process
The State next argued that there was a strong presumption against
pre-statehood withdrawals of lands underlying navigable waters "except
upon a strict and narrow concept of 'public exigency.' "166 Utah as-
serted that "a public exigency requires a public necessity and not simply
an 'appropriate public purpose.' ",167 The State relied on the Supreme
Court's decision in Montana v. United States 168 to support its argument.
In Montana, the Court ruled in favor of the State of Montana and against
a claim that Montana's title to a navigable riverbed had been defeated by
the creation of an Indian reservation prior to statehood.' 69 The Court
in Montana examined whether a "public exigency" would have required
a departure from the federal policy of reserving ownership of the land
under navigable waters for future states. Although the Court did not
find that the treaties with the Crow Nation demonstrated an intent by
the United States to convey the riverbed to the tribe,' 70 the Court em-
161. Id. " '[T]he views of a subsequent Congress form a hazardous basis for inferring
the intent of an earlier one.' " Id. (citing United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960)).
162. Id. at 1523.
163. Id.
164. Id. It was not until 1909 that Congress enacted any law which split estates be-
tween the surface and subsurface. See 30 U.S.C. § 81 (1982); see also Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. i (1965), in which the regulations governing oil and gas leases in the Kenai Moose
Range in Alaska were upheld. Over two million acres were withdrawn for the protection of
moose. Although the Executive Order which created the range did not mention the sub-
surface estate, the Court concluded that there was no doubt that the United States Gov-
ernment retained ownership of it. Id. at 4-5; see Exec. Order No. 8979, 6 Fed. Reg. 6471
(1941).
165. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1523.
166. Id. (citing Montana, 450 U.S. at 552).
167. Id.
168. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
169. Id. at 550.
170. Id. at 556-57. The Court held that title to the bed of the Big Horn River passed to
Montana upon its admission into the Union because the United States had not, prior to
statehood, conveyed beneficial ownership of the riverbed to the Crow Nation by certain
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phasized that a "public exigency" would constitute a valid pre-statehood
conveyance of lands underlying navigable waters and would prevent
passage to a state under the equal footing doctrine.
17
In analyzing the present case, the Tenth Circuit found that a "pub-
lic exigency" clearly did exist at the time of the Utah Lake with-
drawal. 172 The court concluded "that the withdrawal of Utah Lake,
including the bed, was made for a public purpose motivated by a public
exigency, given Congress' stated concerns that arid lands of the western
states be orderly and fairly irrigated, reclaimed, and settled."'
73
b. The Submerged Lands Act
Finally, the State argued that if it did not obtain title to the lakebed
under the equal footing doctrine, it obtained title pursuant to the Sub-
merged Lands Act 174 because the United States was not in "actual pos-
session" of the lakebed in 1953.175 However, the court explained that
sections 1311(a) and (b) (1) of the Submerged Lands Act provide that
the Act does not confirm the title to the states of any lands expressly
retained by the United States. 176 As the court stated, "the United States
expressly reserved the bed of Utah Lake for federal reservoir purposes
in 1889, seven years before Utah became a state. Thus, this case falls
squarely within the language of section 1313(a), and the 1889 with-
drawal remains valid."' 17 7 The court concluded that since the United
States retained title to the lakebed at statehood, Congress specifically




A. Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Company v. United States
1. Facts
Plaintiff Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. (Poverty Flats) brought an
treaties. Id. The Court noted that the treaties expressed no intention by the United States
to convey the riverbed to the tribe. Id. at 554.
171. Id. at 552, 556.
172. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1524.
173. Id.
174. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-43 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984). The court focused particular atten-
tion on sections 1311 (a) and (b) (1) of the Act which read in pertinent part:
(a) It is determined and declared to be in the public interest that (1) title to
and ownership of the lands beneath navigable waters within the boundaries of the
respective States, and the natural resources within such lands and waters ... be,
and they are, subject to the provisions hereof, recognized, confirmed, established
and vested in and assigned to the respective States ... ;
(b)(1) The United States releases and relinquishes unto said States and per-
sons aforesaid, except as otherwise reserved herein, all right, title, and interest of
the United States, if any it has, in and to all said lands, improvements, and natural
resources ....
43 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), (b)(1) (1982 & Supp. II 1984); see Utah, 780 F.2d at 1525.
175. Utah, 780 F.2d at 1524.
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action 179 to quiet title to ranch land in New Mexico. Poverty Flats' pred-
ecessor in interest, the C.L. Crowder Investment Company, had origi-
nally acquired the land in January of 1970, pursuant to an exchange of
lands provision under section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act. 180 The pat-
ent issued to the C.L. Crowder Investment Company reserved to the
United States "[a]ll mineral deposits in the lands so patented, and to it,
or persons authorized by it, the right to prospect, mine and remove such
deposits from the same under the applicable law."'' During the ex-
change negotiations, no discussion was ever had regarding the subject
of caliche 182 and its status as part of the surface or mineral estate.' 8 3 In
June of 1981, Poverty Flats discovered that a lessee of the United States,
Oilfield Construction Company, had entered plaintiff's land and by Feb-
ruary of 1982, was removing dirt, rock, and caliche from the land.'
8 4
Thus, Poverty Flats sought to establish that, under a proper construc-
tion of the land patent, the United States had not reserved an interest in
these materials.
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that the suit was barred by the twelve-year statute of limitations for quiet
title actions against the United States.' 8 5 The Tenth Circuit reversed,
holding that it was error to grant summary judgment on the statute of
limitations issue without determining whether it was unreasonable for
the landowner to believe that the government's reservation of "mineral
rights" included a reservation of caliche, and remanded to the trial court
for such a factual determination.18 6 On remand, the district court found
that the action was brought within the applicable time period, but con-
cluded, as a matter of law, that caliche was included in the mineral reser-
vation. 187 On subsequent appeal, the Tenth Circuit again reversed in
favor of Poverty Flats and ruled that caliche was not included in the min-
eral reservation.
1 8 8
179. Poverty Flats Land & Cattle Co. v. United States, 788 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1986).
180. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at
43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1982)).
181. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 677.
182. "According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary, caliche is 'a crust or
succession of crusts of calcium carbonate that forms within or on top of the stony soil of
arid or semiarid regions.' Caliche is apparently used in road building along with sand and
gravel." Poverty Flats, 706 F.2d at 1079 n.l.
183. Povery Flats, 788 F.2d at 679.
184. Id. at 678-79.
185. Poverty Flats, 706 F.2d at 1078; see 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (1982) (providing for
twelve-year statute of limitations on quiet title actions). The district court found that no-
tice of the mineral reservation in the 1970 patent was notice to the successors in interest,
Poverty Flats, that the United States claimed to own dirt, rock and caliche in the patented
land by virtue of the reservation. Poverty Flats, 706 F.2d at 1079.
186. Poverty Flats, 706 F.2d at 1078, 1080.
187. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 677.
188. Id. at 676, 683-84.
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2. The Decision of the Tenth Circuit
Judge Seth, writing for a unanimous court, addressed the issue of
whether caliche was a statutorily reserved mineral under the Taylor
Grazing Act and the discretionary patent reservation of mineral deposits
or a material not within the reservation of minerals. Judge Seth pro-
ceeded to review the mineral reservation in the context of the Taylor
Grazing Act,18 9 the Surface Resources Act of 1955, 190 and the common
law principles set forth in Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc. 19 1
a. Interpretations of the Taylor Grazing Act
First, the court determined that the patent to the land in question
was expressly provided for in section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act.1
9 2
This statutory provision, according to the court, was unique in that "the
nature and extent of the mineral reservation ... in the patent were left
to the complete discretion of the Secretary of the Interior."' 19 3 The
Tenth Circuit decided that "[t]he unusual statutory provision for com-
plete discretion in the Secretary" eliminated the factor of congressional
intent as to the scope of the reservation which is used in other situations
where a mandatory mineral reservation was provided. 194 Therefore, in-
stead of looking to congressional intent, the court relied upon adminis-
trative interpretations of the Taylor Grazing Act.
189. Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-82 (1982)).
190. The Surface Resources Act of 1955, ch. 375, 69 Stat. 368 (codified as amended at
30 U.S.C. § 611 (1982)).
191. 462 U.S. 36 (1983).
192. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 677-78. Section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act was codified
at 43 U.S.C. § 315g (1970) but was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1982)).
193. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 678. For instance, section 8 of the Taylor Grazing Act
also authorized the Secretary to exchange public lands for state-owned lands. Such an
exchange could be based upon lands of either equal value or equal acreage. In the case of
an exchange by the Secretary of lands of equal acreage which were mineral in character,
section 8 required that the patent contain a reservation of "all minerals" to the United
States. However, in the case of an exchange of lands of equal value, as in this case, the
statute left both the reservation of minerals and the scope of any such reservation to the
discretion of the parties to the exchange and provided in part:
Provided, That either party to an exchange based upon equal value under this
section may make reservations of minerals, easements, or rights of use. Where
reservations are made in lands conveyed either to or by the United States the
right to enjoy them shall be subject to such reasonable conditions respecting in-
gress and egress and the use of the surface of the land as may be deemed
necessary.
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, ch. 865, § 8, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2792 (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1701-82 (1982)) (emphasis added).
194. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 678. The court also noted that the discretionary author-
ity of the Secretary, coupled with the ever-changing policy stance of the Department of the
Interior, made "reliance on similar language or wording in other reservations of question-
able worth." Id. Cf Millsap v. Andrus, 717 F.2d 1326, 1328 (10th Cir. 1983) (where deed
reservation incorporated language of congressional legislation, "the proper construction
of the deed depends on what Congress intended to reserve").
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i. The Mineral Reservation
Generally, federal mineral reservations are to be construed in favor
of the government with no rights passing by implication.' 9 5 However,
federal grants of land resources "are to receive such a construction as
will carry out the intent of Congress,"' 19 6 and "are not to be so con-
strued as to defeat the intent of the legislature, or to withhold what is
given either expressly or by necessary or fair implication."' 9 7 Similarly,
it is well settled that "[p]atent mineral reservations are construed ac-
cording to the purpose for which the legislative body granted the sur-
face and reserved the minerals. Therefore the statute authorizing the
patent controls the reservation if the patent language is erroneous or
even if the reservation is omitted from the patent."' 9 8 The Tenth Cir-
cuit added that a constructional preference in favor of a government
agency which did nothing to reveal its beliefs regarding the scope of a
mineral reservation until eleven years after the transaction, would pro-
mote instability of land titles and unfairly penalize innocent grantees. 1
9 9
Following the 1970 land transaction in Poverty Flats, evidence
showed that the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) began to construe
mineral reservations in a different way and classified caliche as a "min-
eral." However, "[t]his change was not made known publicly and the
Government point[ed] to no notice or change in the regulations. '20 0 As
the court indicated, the inconsistency with this policy change lay in the
fact that the caliche sold to the Oilfield Construction Company "was
sold as a common surface material [and] not treated as a 'mineral.' "201
b. The Surface Resources Act of 1955
The Surface Resources Act of 1955202 was enacted to remove a
large group of "common materials" from the "locatable minerals" cate-
gory. Common "materials" were removed from the application of the
mining laws and put under a permit system. 20 3 The court held that the
United States was improperly attempting to place caliche into the cate-
195. See United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 112, 116 (1957) (grant of right-
of-way through public lands by United States to railroad company did not convey mineral
lands where expressly reserved by Congress); see also Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Prod.
Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978).
196. Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668, 682 (1979) (quoting Winona & St.
Peter R. Co. v. Barney, 113 U.S. 618, 625 (1885)).
197. Id. at 682-83 (quoting United States v. Denver & Rio Grande R. Co., 150 U.S. 1,
14 (1893)).
198. See Mall, Federal Mineral Reservations, 20 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 399, 410 (1975).
199. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 683.
200. Id. at 679.
201. Id.
202. 30 U.S.C. §§ 601-15 (1976). This was intended to "prevent mining locations on
public lands containing these materials being made with a view to ultimately obtaining title
to the lands." Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 680.
203. Section 611 of the Surface Resources Act provides in part that "[n]o deposit of
common varieties of sand, stone, gravel . . . shall be deemed a valuable mineral deposit
within the meaning of the mining ... laws so as to give effective validity to any mining
claim hereafter located under such mining laws." 30 U.S.C. § 611 (1982).
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gory of minerals, known as "mineral materials," outside the scope of the
Surface Resources Act. According to the Court, though, caliche could
not be both a "locatable mineral" falling within the mineral reservation
and a "common material" under the Surface Resources Act. 20 4 As Judge
Seth stated, "[c]aliche cannot be both fish and fowl."' 20 5 The court con-
cluded that caliche is a non-locatable common surface material.20 6
c. Western Nuclear Applied
Finally, the Tenth Circuit distinguished Poverty Flats from Watt v.
Western Nuclear, Inc., 207 in which the United States Supreme Court held
that gravel was a mineral reserved to the United States under the Stock
Raising Homestead Act of 1916.208 The two cases evidence separate
tests used by courts to determine what is to be considered a mineral
under a mineral reservation: the separate value test 20 9 and the settled
expectations test.
21 0
i. The Separate Value Test
In Western Nuclear, the Supreme Court relied on the separate value
test 2 1' to determine that gravel was a reserved mineral. The Court con-
cluded that in order for a substance to be a reserved mineral under the
Stock Raising Homestead Act, it must first be "mineral in character,"
capable of being "removed from the soil," and able to "be used for com-
mercial purposes."'2 12 Secondly, "there [must] be no reason to suppose
204. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 680.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 683; see United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. 500 (1968); see also Robert L.
Berry, 25 I.B.L.A. 287, 294-96 (1976) (holding that "common dirt," while literally a min-
eral, cannot be classified as a locatable mineral).
207. 462 U.S. 36 (1983). Western Nuclear purchased land on which an open gravel pit
was located. The conveyance of the land patent was made in 1926 and was issued under
the Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916 (SRHA), 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1976), suspended
by Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43
U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1982)). The patent reserved to the United States "all the coal and
other minerals." Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 37. Western Nuclear, as part of its mining
and milling operations, used gravel obtained from the pit.
In 1975, the Wyoming office of the Bureau of Land Management (the BLM) cited
Western Nuclear for trespass upon the mineral estate. At the administrative hearing, the
BLM determined that the gravel on and underlying Western Nuclear's land was reserved
to the United States. Id. at 41. Following several appeals to administrative agencies and
lower federal courts, the case was appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 36. The Court, in
a 5-4 decision, concluded that gravel was a mineral under the SRHA reservation. Id. at 60.
208. Stock Raising Homestead Act of 1916, 43 U.S.C. §§ 291-301 (1976), suspended by
Taylor Grazing Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-482, 48 Stat. 1269, repealed by Federal Land
Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43
U.S.C. § 1701-82 (1982)).
209. See Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526 (1903) (land containing
deposits of common substances are classified as mineral lands if the deposits render the
land more valuable than for agricultural purposes).
210. See Leo Sheep Co. v. United States, 440 U.S. 668 (1979) (recognizing the expecta-
tions of patentees).
211. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 53-54; see supra note 209.
212. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 53.
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[it was] intended to be included in the surface estate." 213 Applying this
test, the Western Nuclear Court categorized gravel as a valuable, locatable
mineral.
2 14
In Poverty Flats, Judge Seth concluded that caliche has never been
considered a locatable mineral "under any administrative or court deci-
sion or practice and thus [did] not meet Western Nuclear's basic require-
ment."'2 15 Moreover, the court decided that caliche does not qualify as a
locatable mineral as defined in Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products.2 16 The
court noted that although caliche has "value as fill dirt and surfacing...
[n]othing can be extracted from it nor derived from it. It is used by
reason of its physical characteristics only."'2 17 Furthermore, its occur-
rence over vast areas of the West necessitated the categorization as a
non-locatable common surface material and not as a mineral within the
scope of the reservation.
2 18
ii. Settled Expectations Test
This test looks to the expectations of patentees at the time the pat-
ent was issued. The test was first recognized in Leo Sheep Company v.
United States219 and is premised on the need for certainty and predict-
ability in land titles. Accordingly, the implied reservations in a patent
cannot be asserted after patentees have come to expect certain stability
in their titles.
2 20
The dissent in Western Nuclear emphasized that western settlers had
expectations of perpetual ownership and control of the land.22 1 How-
ever, the majority in that case did not apply the settled expectations test
to determine the meaning of a "mineral" under the Stock Raising
Homestead Act mineral reservation.
Poverty Flats acknowledged the recognized position of the BLM at
the time the Taylor Grazing Act was enacted and when the patent was
issued to Poverty Flats' predecessor in title. The court indicated that
caliche was not considered a mineral under the Secretary of Interior's
mineral reservation at the time of the exchange. The court considered
and applied the settled expectations test of Leo Sheep to determine the
meaning of a "mineral" under the Taylor Grazing Act exchange mineral
reservation. Therefore, by not claiming ownership in caliche for nearly
eleven years, the surface owners had the right to expect that this mate-
213. Id.
214. Id. at 59-60.
215. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 682.
216. 462 U.S. 604 (1978). The Tenth Circuit noted that the Charlestone Court had
"considered the two factors on which the experts based their opinion in the case before
us:" chemical identification as a mineral and whether the substance had value. Poverty
Flats, 788 F.2d at 682.
217. Poverty Flats, 788 F.2d at 683.
218. Id.
219. 440 U.S. 668 (1979).
220. Id. at 687.
221. Western Nuclear, 462 U.S. at 71-72 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell defended
the concept of "citizen sovereignty" of the soil. Id. at 71 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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rial was part of the surface estate. To now take caliche away from Pov-
erty Flats would raise serious doubts regarding the extent of land titles
granted under the Taylor Grazing Act. As stated by the Supreme Court
in Leo Sheep, there is a "special need for certainty and predictability
where land titles are concerned.
22 2
In conclusion, Poverty Flats marked the triumph of the rights of pri-
vate citizens over the claim of the United States Government to a mate-
rial not specifically mentioned in a mineral reservation. The Tenth
Circuit refused to extend the litany of "minerals" which the government
may claim under mineral reservations and thereby limited the scope of
governmental power.
IV. ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
A. Lidstone v. Block
1. Facts
In 1976, the City of Cheyenne Board of Public Utilities applied to
the United States Forest Service for a right of way over part of the
Medicine Bow National Forest in order to construct a water diversion
project. 22 3 The purpose of the project was to provide an adequate sup-
ply of water for the City of Cheyenne, Wyoming. At that time, Chey-
enne was drawing water from wells and from Douglas Creek, a tributary
of the North Platte River. The Douglas Creek water diversion project
was referred to as Stage 1.224 Stage I and additional water sources sup-
plied approximately 14,700 acre-feet of water annually to the City of
Cheyenne.
225
In view of anticipated growth and attendant increase in water de-
mand, Cheyenne proposed a project in 1978, known as Stage II, seeking
to increase its annual water supply to approximately 28,100 acre-feet.2 26
Following the procedure established in the Stage I project, the Stage II
application proposed the diversion of additional water from the North
Platte River with replacement from the Little Snake River. To accom-
modate the increased water flow, the city proposed to expand the Stage
222. Leo Sheep, 440 U.S. at 687.
223. Lidstone v. Block, 773 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1985); EPA Final Environmental Im-
pact Statment for the City of Cheyenne [hereinafter FEIS] at 2 (December 8, 1981).
224. FEIS, supra note 223, at 4. Under the provisions of Stage I, Cheyenne constructed
the Rob Roy Reservoir on Douglas Creek and a pipeline to transport water to the Granite
Springs Reservoir. However, the Stage I diversion project permits were conditioned on
the replacement of water taken from the North Platte with water drawn from the tributa-
ies of the Little Snake River on the western side of the Continental Divide. Id.
In order to meet this condition, Cheyenne constructed a diversion and collection sys-
tem which draws water from certain tributaries of the Little Snake River and transports the
water through a tunnel under the Continental Divide to Hog Park Reservoir. Water is
released from the Hog Park Reservoir into the Encampment River, a tributary of the North
Platte. The Little Snake diversion and the Hog Park Reservoir collection system were
constructed on lands in the Medicine Bow National Forest under a permit from the United
States Forest Service. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 15.
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I project by constructing additional diversion structures and pipelines
on tributaries of the Little Snake that had not previously been af-
fected.2 2 7 This expansion project included construction over lands in
the Medicine Bow National Forest; therefore, the city applied for a right
of way pursuant to section 501 of the Federal Land Policy and Manage-
ment Act (FLPMA).
2 28
In accordance with the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act,2 2 9 an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was prepared
by the Forest Service. The initial EIS was rated inadequate by the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency and a revised draft was prepared. 23 0 On
December 8, 1981, the Regional Forester issued the Final Environmen-
tal Impact Statement (FEIS) together with his Record of Decision, which
granted a conditional right of way that was more restrictive than that
sought in Cheyenne's application. 23 ' The Forest Service found that
Cheyenne's proposal was not environmentally acceptable because it did
not provide for the required maintenance and flushing flows in all di-
verted streams. 2 32 Consequently, the Forest Service eliminated Chey-
enne's proposal and instead selected five alternatives for detailed study
and comparison. 23 3 The right of way which was granted by the Forest
Service was consistent with Alternative C.2 3 4 Although Alternative C
would not permit all of the diversion facilities that Cheyenne had pro-
posed, this alternative would provide for the required maintenance and
flushing flows in all the diverted streams. 23 5 Additionally, the Regional
Forester placed two conditions on the issuance of the permits: (1) Chey-
enne was required to demonstrate its financial ability to carry out the
project, since the bond issue to finance the project had been defeated in
a municipal election; and (2) a joint statement from the city and State of
Wyoming was required that, in essence, would justify that the selected
227. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136. Additionally, the city proposed to enlarge both the
Hog Park Reservoir and the Rob Roy Reservoir to accommodate the increased flow. The
city also proposed to construct another pipeline from the Rob Roy Reservoir to carry the
water to the City of Cheyenne. The estimated cost of the Stage II diversion project was
$100,000,000. FEIS, supra note 223, at 18-19.
228. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136; 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701, 1761-71 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
229. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
230. FEIS, supra note 223, at 5.
231. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136. The FEIS included a comprehensive discussion of the
city's proposal, alternatives to the proposal, and the environmental impacts of certain al-
ternatives. Id.
232. FEIS, supra note 223, at 19.
233. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136. The five alternatives were: (A) the no action alterna-
tive; (B) Cheyenne's full proposal coupled with environmental restrictions; (C) mitigation
measures which limited the extent of the new diversion facilities in the Little Snake Basin,
but permitted full development of the remainder of the proposal with the application of
the mitigation measures; (D) mitigation measures which would have replaced the Little
Snake diversion system with a reservoir on that river and a pumping station to deliver
water to the existing tunnel under the Continental Divide, and; (E) mitigation measures
which would have abandoned Stage II and relied instead on a combination of water con-
servation, water rights purchase and groundwater development to meet the estimated de-
mand. FEIS, supra note 223, at 82-101.
234. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1136.
235. FEIS, supra note 223, at 1-2.
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alternative was compatible with the State's water development plans. 23 6
Subsequently, Cheyenne amended its application by postponing,
for ten to fifteen years, the construction of the additional pipelines from
Douglas Creek to the city's water system. Although this reduced the
estimated cost of the project by $40,000,000, there was not a similar
reduction in the amount of water to be transferred from the Little Snake
to the North Platte River.23 7 State legislation required the City to mar-
ket the excess water and to apply the proceeds to repayment of a loan
made by the state to the city to finance construction. 23 8 Voters ap-
proved the revised bond issue and the city and state provided a state-
ment that the project was compatible with the State's water development
plans. Since the two conditions had been met, the Regional Forester
issued the permits and this decision was affirmed by the Chief of the
Forest Service.
239
Appellants then brought this action in the United States District
Court for the District of Wyoming challenging the Forest Service's deci-
sion to grant the right of way. The complaint alleged violations of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),2 40 the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act (FLPMA), 2 4 ' the Endangered Species Act, 2 4 2 the
Upper Colorado River Basin Compact (Compact), 24 3 and the Supreme
Court's decree in Nebraska v. Wyoming. 24 4 The appellants then moved to
disqualify the trial judge, Judge Brimmer. The stated grounds for dis-
qualification were that the judge had made a financial contribution to a
committee organized to promote the passage of the bond issues for the
Stage II water diversion project.
24 5
2. The Lower Court Decision
The district court denied the motion to disqualify, concluding that
Judge Brimmer's small contribution to an organization supporting the
bond issue did not create a reasonable question as to his impartiality.
24 6
The court also dismissed all claims based on the Nebraska v. Wyoming
case, the Compact, and the Endangered Species Act.24 7 Finally, the
court granted the federal and city defendants' motion for summary judg-
ment on the NEPA and FLPMA claims. The lower court concluded that
the FEIS contained a satisfactory discussion of the alternatives and had
dealt with the issues appellants raised under the Upper Colorado River
236. Id. at 1.
237. Id. at 20.
238. Id. at 17. See Wyo. STAT. § 41-2-210(e) (Cum. Supp. 1984).
239. FEIS, supra note 223, at 17-18.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-70 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
241. 43 U.S.C. § 1701-84 (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
242. 16 U.S.C. § 15 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
243. Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949); see infra note 261
and accompanying text.
244. 325 U.S. 589 (1945).
245. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137; see infra note 250.
246. Id. at 1137-38.
247. Id. at 1136. The claim under the Endangered Species Act was dropped.
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Basin Compact and the decree in Nebraska v. Wyoming. The court also
rejected the FLPMA claim, holding that the selection of Alternative C
and the mitigation measures ordered by the Forest Service satisfied its
duty to limit the right of way so as to do no unnecessary damage to the
environment.
2 48
3. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Affirming the district court's decision, the Tenth Circuit found that
the environmental effects of the proposed project had been thoroughly
examined. 249 Judge Seth, writing for the court, agreed that no personal
bias could be found in Judge Brimmer's contribution to a Cheyenne or-
ganization seeking to educate the public about the bond issue proposed
for the expansion of the water system.
250
a. Standard of Review - Environmental Impact Statement
The standard of judicial review of an environmental impact state-
ment is well established and was described in Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Andrus:
2 5 1
Judicial review of an EIS is limited to a consideration of the
following: (1) does the EIS discuss all of the five procedural
requirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C); (2) does the EIS
constitute a good faith compliance with the demands of NEPA;
and (3) does the statement contain a reasonable discussion of
the subject matter involved in the five respective areas?
252
248. Id. at 1137.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1137-38. The appellants attempted to disqualify the district court judge on
the basis of a modest financial contribution, twenty-five dollars, made by Judge Brimmer,
before suit was filed, to a group in Cheyenne seeking to inform the public about a pro-
posed bond issue to finance the Stage II expansion project. Disqualification was sought
under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) (1982), which states that ajudge "shall disqual-
ify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned."
Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137.
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Judge Brimmer properly remained sitting on this
action because "the plaintiff's failed to meet the standard set forth in United States v. Irwin."
Id. (citing United States v. Irwin, 561 F.2d 198 (10th Cir. 1977)). The standard is that
"[t]he bias charged must be of a personal nature and must be such as would likely result in
a decision on some basis other than what the judge learned from his participation in the
case." Irwin, 561 F.2d at 200.
In affirmingJudge Brimmer's decision not to recuse himself, Judge Seth pointed out
that the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate any real connection between the contribution
and the issue of whether the Forest Service complied with the applicable federal law. Lid-
stone, 773 F.2d at 1137-38.
251. 619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980) (Environmental groups sought to compel the Sec-
retary of the Interior to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act in connection
with approving detailed development plans prepared by defendant lessees, in lieu of an
environmental impact statement, under a prototype oil shale leasing program.).
252. Id. at 1376 (quoting Save Our Invaluable Land (SOIL), Inc. v. Needham, 542 F.2d
539, 542-43 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977)). The five procedural re-
quirements listed in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) are:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the propo-
sal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
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Thus, the duty of the reviewing court is limited to determining whether
the consideration and disclosure of the environmental consequences
was adequate. 2 53 Moreover, the reviewing court may not substitute its
judgment for that of the agency as to the ultimate choice of action.
2 54
The National Environmental Protection Act requires that an EIS in-
clude a comprehensive examination of the relevant environmental con-
sequences of a project and that the reviewing agency disclose the results
to the public. 25 5 The Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to grant rights of way
over lands in national forests for "reservoirs, canals, ditches, flumes, lat-
erals, pipes, pipelines, tunnels, and other facilities and systems for the
impoundment, storage, transportation, or distribution of water."
'25 6
Furthermore, the FLPMA requires that each right of way must be "lim-
ited to the ground which the Secretary ... determines . . . will do no
unnecessary damage to the environment. ' 2 57 Also rights of way must
contain terms and conditions that will "minimize damage to scenic and
esthetic values and fish and wildlife habitat and otherwise protect the
environment. '2 58 Finally, the FLPMA requires that the location of the
right a way be "along a route that will cause least damage to the environ-
ment, taking into consideration feasibility and other relevant fac-
tors." 25 9 In the present case, the Tenth Circuit found that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in its review of whether the Forest
Service had complied with the requirements of the FLPMA and NEPA.
b. Water Diversion Issues
Appellants also advanced issues related solely to water rights. The
court found, however, that right of way applications for a water project
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be
involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
253. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976) ("The only role for a court is
to insure that the agency has taken a 'hard look' at environmental consequences; it cannot
'interject itself within the area of discretion of the executive as to the choice of the action
to be taken.' "); see, e.g., Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 97-98 (1983); Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S.
223, 227-28 (1980) (per curiam) (agency must not elevate environmental concerns over
other appropriate considerations); Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 553 (1978) (NEPA imposes "upon an agency
the obligation to consider every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a pro-
posed action.").
254. Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 560 (10th Cir. 1977) ("court should not sec-
ond-guess the experts"); Save Our Invaluable Land (SOIL), Inc., 542 F.2d at 543 ("Nor
should the courts in evaluating an EIS engage in hindsight judgment by way of second
guessing."); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1002-03 (10th Cir.) (court
rejected concept that environmental statement is judicially reviewable on the merits to
determine sufficiency), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 993 (1973).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (1982 & Supp. I 1984).
256. 43 U.S.C. § 1761(a)(1) (1982).
257. 43 U.S.C. § 1764(a)(4) (1982).
258. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(a)(ii) (1982).
259. 43 U.S.C. § 1765(b)(v) (1982).
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involve land use determinations and not water rights determinations. 260
Therefore, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
water rights arguments based on alleged violations of the Nebraska v.
Wyoming decree and the Upper Colorado River Compact. The court em-
phasized "that the right of way grant had nothing to do with the ques-
tion as to whether Wyoming could move the water out of the Snake
River Basin." 2 6 1 Consequently, the court held that the Forest Service
260. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137.
261. Id. Appellants argued that the Upper Colorado River Basin Compact precluded
transbasin diversion of the Little Snake River. Id. at 1136. The Compact was designed to
protect allocations of water between the states, not the methods of dividing waters within
the state boundaries. The most applicable language of the Compact is Article XI, section
(f), which states that "[wiater use projects initiated after the signing of this Compact, to the
greatest extent possible, shall permit the full use within the Basin in the most feasible
manner of the waters of the Little Snake River and its tributaries." Upper Colorado River
Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31, 39 (1949).
The State Engineer of Wyoming specifically required the diversion of Little Snake
waters into the North Platte Basin under this project. In so doing, the State Engineer
indicated that the State may appropriate water for use in Wyoming so long as the amount
is within its apportionment under the Compact and so long as the State meets its delivery
obligation to the Lower Basin. FEIS, supra note 223, at 13-23. The Compact must be
interpreted in light of the principle expressed in Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589
(1945): "Our problem is not to determine what allocation would be equitable among the
canals in Nebraska or among those in Wyoming. That is a problem of internal administra-
tion for each of the States." Id. at 645.
Article VIII, section 3, of the Wyoming Constitution deals with "internal administra-
tion" and expresses the rule as follows: "Priority of appropriation for beneficial uses shall
give the better right. No appropriation shall be denied except when such denial is de-
manded by the public interests." WYo. CONsT. art. VIII, § 3. This does not prohibit trans-
basin diversion. In Willey v. Decker, 11 Wyo. 496, 531, 73 P. 210, 220 (1903), the
following principle was established: "The appropriator, though he may not own the land
on either bank of a running stream, may divert the water therefrom, and carry the same
whithersoever necessity may require for beneficial use, without returning it, or any of it, to
the natural stream in any manner." Id. (quoting Oppenlander v. Left-Hand Ditch Co., 18
Colo. 1012, 31 P. 854 (1892)); see also, Moyer v. Preston, 6 Wyo. 308, 44 P. 845 (1896).
In 1929 the United States Supreme Court resolved a dispute between Wyoming and
Colorado involving the waters of the Laramie River. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419
(1929). The Laramie flows north from Colorado into Wyoming. Colorado appropriators
built a canal to divert water out of the Laramie River Basin into a foreign basin for agricul-
tural use. Wyoming complained that "the waters of this interstate stream cannot rightfully
be taken from its watershed and carried into another." Id. at 456-57. In finding for Colo-
rado and allowing the transbasin diversion, the Court noted that both states subscribed to
a policy of prior appropriation which allowed transbasin diversion. The Court stated:
Both States pronounce the rule just and reasonable as applied to the natural
conditions in that region; and to prevent any departure from it the people of both
incorporated into their constitutions. It originated in the customs and usages of
the people before either State came into existence, and the courts of both hold
that their constitutional provisions are to be taken as recognizing the prior usage
rather than as creating a new rule.
Id. at 470.
The Upper Colorado River Basin Compact, ch. 48, 63 Stat. 31 (1949), does not pro-
hibit transbasin diversion, it promotes beneficial use. Article XI, section (c) of the Com-
pact reads: "Water uses under the apportionment made by this Article shall be in
accordance with the principle that beneficial use shall be the basis, measure and limit of
the right to use." 63 Stat. at 38.
Furthermore, Article III, section (b) reads as follows:
The apportionment made to the respective States by paragraph (a) of this
Article is based upon, and shall be applied in conformity with, the following prin-
ciples and each of them:
(1) the apportionment is of any and all man-made depletions;
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properly restricted its environmental study to the land use issues with
which it had the authority to deal and evaluate.
262
4. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit correctly concluded that the district court had
properly followed the established standard of review in considering a
challenge to an EIS. The grant of a right of way is an agency action
subject to judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
2 6 3
Under that statute, the decision must be upheld unless it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
1aw."1264
The FEIS demonstrated that the Forest Service did not violate its
duty under the FLPMA when it granted the right of way. The Regional
Forester met the requirements of the FLPMA and NEPA by thoroughly
examining the environmental consequences of the project and recom-
mending an approach which would minimize environmental damage.26 5
The Tenth Circuit found that, procedurally, the Forest Service had con-
sidered all "feasible, reasonable alternatives." '2 6 6 The district court did
not have the authority to second guess the judgment of the Forest Ser-
vice, but only to determine if the Forest Service had complied with the
requirements of preparing an EIS. The Tenth Circuit properly affirmed
the district court's decision.
Suzanne L. Schmelter
(4) The apportionment to each State includes all water necessary for the supply
of any rights which now exist.
63 Stat. at 33.
262. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137.
263. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
264. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
265. Lidstone, 773 F.2d at 1137.
266. Id.
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